INTRODUCTION

20.
Globally, deltas are home to around 500 million people (Giosan et al. 2014). They generate 21. significant rice, fish, shrimp and other agricultural outputs (Chu et al. 2010 ). They perform Ecology and Society -ES-2017-9559 (Version 3 of ES-2016-8755) 302. to identify the underlying contextual drivers of this situation. We identified four key underlying 303. contextual drivers that generate institutional, social, cultural, and economic feedbacks that 304. reinforce this vulnerable state of rice farming. Our research suggested that these underlying 305. contextual drivers were i) the institutions surrounding land ownership, ii) the nature of formal 306. institutional support, iii) lack of employment diversity, and iv) expenses related to cultural 307. activities.
308.
LAND OWNERSHIP AND SIZE OF LAND HOLDINGS
309.
The median area of land owned by the households surveyed was 0.8 hectares (ha), with a mean of 1.2 310. ha, and the median total area of land cultivated by households (i.e. including land cultivated by 311. sharecroppers) was 2 ha (mean = 2.3 ha). Larger land holdings increased the odds of rice harvests 312. meeting household needs for a longer period of time and of needing to use lower proportions for 313. household consumption (p < 0.05; Table 3 ). These results demonstrate the importance of adequate 314. land access in enabling rice farming to meet household needs.
315.
Of the surveyed households, 57% held plots under sharecropping arrangements, whereby a farmer worked 316. another persons land, in exchange for either a small fee or a proportion of the crops produced.
317.
Sharecropping almost without exception prevented the farmer from investing in land, farming 318. resources, crops or tools. One sharecropping household commented that the landowners do not invest 319. any money in the land (SSI:10), another sharecropper stated that he approached the land owner about 320. sharecropping arrangements as the land had been idle for 7 years with the landowner now contributing 321. half the cost of pesticides (SSI:20). In some cases sharecroppers also change plots at frequent 322. intervals; for example, one sharecropper cultivates land away from his village and changes plot 323. every year (SSI: 22). Lack of land ownership and small areas of land ownership act as feedback 324. mechanisms that impede post disaster resilience.
325.
FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
326.
Local governance institutions (which include the relevant offices of the agricultural department, 327. the Block office, and the village level administration -known as Panchayati Raj) often do not 328. function in accordance with the needs of rice farmers, especially the poorest. In some villages 329. irrigation canals were not maintained leaving farmers vulnerable to crop losses (due to moisture 330. shortages). Seeds were not always available at the Block offices [10] or co-operatives in time for 331. planting; this meant farmers used lower yielding traditional seeds or seeds purchased in private 332. markets. Furthermore, awareness of when seeds were available at the Block was communicated through 333. social networks (i.e. larger, well-endowed farmers with Block level contacts would find out inputs 334. had arrived at the Block agricultural office and news would be distributed via their networks).
335.
There was not equal awareness amongst farmers of the availability of inputs at the Block office.
336.
The distribution of resources from the Block level worked against small scale farmers. The storm 337. surge in the 1999 super cyclone increased the salinity of many coastal fields; in response the 338. government distributed gypsum to farmers from the Block offices. However, travelling to the Block 339. office created significant transaction costs both in terms of lost time (which could otherwise be 340. spent earning an income) and through funding travel. For these reasons farmers were unwilling to 341. visit the Block office or transport gypsum to their fields (interview with Block level agricultural 342. officer). Another farmer noted that he buys seeds in the private market, as the Block is too far 343. away (SSI:17); though many farmers were accessing seeds locally through cooperatives. These examples 344. illustrate how a combination of institutional management of inputs and local geography impedes some 345. farmers' access to resources that support rice cropping and recovery of cultivation following 346. climate hazards.
347.
The nature of agricultural extension meant many small scale farmers were excluded from knowledge and 348. skill transfers. Only 13% of households have attended training or demonstrations. It was reported 349. that training and demonstrations were attended by, 'or for', larger farmers. A small scale rice 350. farmer noted that training took place 'yesterday' but only farmers 'with more land' go (SSI:27).
351.
This reflects the agricultural department policy of strategically targeting a handful of progressive 352. farmers in each panchayat. A pattern emerges whereby there was unequal access to agricultural 353. extension, which worked against the small scale cultivators. Thus, small scale farmers relied on 354. rice cropping with low yields, neither accruing resources to cope with shocks or external knowledge 355. to adapt or enhance cultivation practices.
356.
EMPLOYMENT DIVERSITY
357.
A lack of suitable alternative livelihood strategies left many rice farmers in a situation whereby 358. they relied on cultivating yet remained vulnerable to recurrent climate hazards. 75% of households 359. undertook daily wage labour as part of a mix of livelihood strategies and to compensate for crop 360. losses following natural hazards (Table 5 ). However, wage labour did not serve as a springboard for 361. households to invest in rice cropping. Only 35% of households were able to supplement rice farming 362. via regular public or private sector employment.
363.
Ecology and Society -ES-2017-9559 (Version 3 of ES-2016-8755) 13 EXPENSES RELATED TO CULTURAL ACTIVITIES 364. Households struggling to access food via rice farming strategies remained saddled with other income 365. stresses. These could be large significant events such as weddings or repeat small scale household 366. expenditures, e.g. for medicine. Weddings presented households with substantial costs, but due to 367. their cultural importance farmers often prioritised saving income for this endeavour. As a result 368. scarce financial resources were not invested into enhancing returns from rice farming. For example, 385. Rice farming is precarious; it does not generate resources to allow farmers to effectively respond 386. to climate hazards and necessitates a range of coping strategies to sustain livelihoods. Climate 387. hazards, such as the floods in 2008 and Cyclone Phailin interact with this livelihood-farming system 388. to amplify vulnerabilities and limit opportunities for improved rice cropping. For example, many 389. farmers are dependent upon loans to support subsistence rice farming, and rice farming does not 390. generate returns to pay back loans. To be able to repay loans, in order to obtain credit for the 391. following season, households often sold small portions of their harvest (which was already 392. insufficient), used remittances if available, or sought daily wage labour [11] . Remittances did not 393. provide an income flow to stimulate growth of climate resilient and productive rice cropping.
394.
Remittances from high-skilled migrants were rarely invested to increase returns from rice cropping 395. but more often spent on building large concrete ('pukka') homes. Remittances from low-skilled 
413.
While the coping strategies undertaken by rice farmers partly contribute to the persistence of 414. vulnerability (e.g. through depletion of assets, increases in, or maintenance of, debt) they do 415. fully not explain why vulnerability occurs or persists. These coping strategies can be seen as 416. symptoms of the absence of resilience; ultimately a range of contextual factors interact to maintain 417. this low-productivity low-resilience state of rice farming. These contextual factors undermine 418. resilience in myriad ways often reinforcing low return rice cropping that precludes wealth 419. generation, necessitates coping, and does not provide farmers with resources to respond adequately 420. to climate shocks. For example, the institutions governing land access mean many households operate 421. small plots that do not generate sufficient returns as there is no surplus to sell. Thus small and 422. insecure land holdings act as a break on income accrual and asset accumulation that can be used to 423. smooth the impact of crop losses following climate hazards.
424.
Formal institutional support from the local government does not align with the needs, capacities, or 425. context of small scale rice farmers. There are reinforcing links between contextual factors such 426. limited access to land and government support, that serves to undermine rice farming and keep 427. farmers in a vulnerable state. This is illustrated by sharecroppers who reported difficulties in 428. accessing loans and government schemes to support agriculture without a certificate of land 429. ownership (a 'patta'). In contrast to sharecroppers; farmers who owned land were more likely to fund 430. cultivation via formal credit (co-operatives) while also having a higher probability of not using 431. money lenders (informal) or daily wage labouring (p < 0.05, Table 7 ). This was despite 
482.
findings have relevance for both these agendas in the context of rural delta regions. In particular 483. we highlight that agricultural development policy seeking to make rice farming more resilient to 484. climate hazards should identify and tackle contextual factors that maintain vulnerability. Until 485. these contextual challenges are addressed, initiatives that seek to enhance agricultural output in 486. hazardous locations (such as deltas) will continue to fail to deliver resilience to subsistence rice 487. farmers', whose livelihoods will continue to be undermined by the simple daily turning of the 488. planet. Gave away as a gift 0 0.67 0 0 a The column headers refer to how households allocated their rice harvest between different uses. For example, 67.67% of households in our sample used between 75 and 100% of their rice harvest for own consumption in their home. Table 3 . Table 3 . The effect (coefficient) of household asset levels, socio-economic standing, access to institutional support and partaking in other livelihood strategies on a household's use of harvested rice and the length of time harvested rice met household consumption needs. (* denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a and b refer to the coefficients estimated for a random effects ordered logit model. For a a negative coefficient implies that less of rice harvested from fields cultivated by the household is used for household consumption; for b a negative coefficient implies that rice harvested from fields cultivated by the household will last for a shorter period of time. c refers to a member of the household in government employment or private sector employment. d refers to a member of the household currently in permanent or temporary migration). a and b refer to the coefficients estimated for a random effects ordered logit model. For a a negative coefficient implies that less of rice harvested from fields cultivated by the household is used for household consumption; for b a negative coefficient implies that rice harvested from fields cultivated by the household will last for a shorter period of time. c refers to a member of the household in government employment or private sector employment. d refers to a member of the household currently in permanent or temporary migration. Table 4 . Table 4 . The effect (coefficient) of household asset levels, socio-economic standing, access to institutional support and partaking in other livelihood strategies on a household's probability of suffering greater crop loss following the 2008 floods or cyclone Phailin and the probability to take longer to recover pre-2008 flood rice cropping levels. (* denotes statistical significance at p < 0.1. ** denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. a and c refers to coefficients estimated using random effects ordered logit models. Here, a negative coefficient implies that a lower amount of crop loss was sustained by the hazard event. b refers to the coefficient representing the influence of a given variable on the probability a household took two or more years to recover rice cropping to pre-2008 levels. This was estimated using a random effects binary logit model. Here, a negative coefficient implies that a household took less than two years to recover following the 2008 floods. d refers to a member of the household in government employment or private sector employment. e refers to a member of the household currently in permanent or temporary migration a and c refers to coefficients estimated using random effects ordered logit models. Here, a negative coefficient implies that a lower amount of crop loss was sustained by the hazard event.
489.
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b refers to the coefficient representing the influence of a given variable on the probability a household took two or more years to recover rice cropping to pre-2008 levels. This was estimated using a random effects binary logit model. Here, a negative coefficient implies that a household took less than two years to recover following the 2008 floods. d refers to a member of the household in government employment or private sector employment. e refers to a member of the household currently in permanent or temporary migration. Did not need to cope -could carry on as usual 8.33 19.33 Table 6 . Table 6 . Sources of funding used by households to pay for costs of cultivation. (Each cell represented as proportion of all households (N=300)).
Source of funding Proportion of Households (%)
Loans from family and kin 26
Loans from money lenders 37
Loans from self-help groups 8
Loans from banks 6
Loans from co-operatives 42
Mortgaging land 5
Daily wage labour 24
Other Table 7 . Table 7 . The effect (coefficient) of land ownership on the probability of farmers funding costs of cultivation from different sources. (a refers to coefficients estimated from a random effects binary logit model where land ownership is the predictor variable and the source of funding is a binary response variable. * denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Loans from banks, self-help groups or funding cultivation by mortgaging land were not included in the logistic regression model due to the limited number of responses in these categories). 
Source of funding
